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CRIMINALIZING SUPPORT
FOR TERRORISM:
A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
ADAM TOMKINS*

1

In Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project the U.S. Supreme Court
held, six to three, that the federal crime of knowingly providing
2
“material support or resources to a foreign terrorist organization” is
constitutional, at least as applied to the particular forms of support
3
that the plaintiffs sought to provide. This essay examines the legal
and constitutional issues arising in Holder v. Humanitarian Law
Project from a comparative perspective and, in particular, in light of
developments in the United Kingdom and in European law. Part I
begins with a brief overview of counter-terrorism law in the UK. Part
II examines the role played specifically by criminal law in the UK’s
struggle against terrorism. Part III examines the aspects of UK and
European counter-terrorism law, which most sharply reflect on the
issues arising in Holder.
The Holder plaintiffs, two U.S. citizens and six domestic
organizations, wished to support the lawful and nonviolent activities
of two groups that the Secretary of State had designated as “foreign
terrorist organizations”: namely, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)
and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). These groups aim
to establish independent states, respectively, for Kurds in Turkey and
for Tamils in Sri Lanka. Both groups engage in political and
humanitarian activities, but both groups also have committed terrorist
4
attacks, some of which have harmed U.S. citizens.
* John Millar Professor of Public Law, University of Glasgow, UK.
1. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705 (2010).
2. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2339B(a)(1) (West 2010).
3. Holder, 130 S. Ct. at 2720 (The opinion of the Court was delivered by Chief Justice
Roberts, joined by Justices Stevens, Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito. Justice Breyer filed a
dissenting opinion, in which Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor joined.).
4. Id. at 2713.
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Material support is legislatively defined to include “any property,
tangible or intangible, or service . . . , training, expert advice or
5
assistance . . . ,” among other matters. The plaintiffs challenged the
constitutionality of the material support provision on two grounds:
first that it was impermissibly vague, contrary to the Fifth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause, and second that it violated their
6
First Amendment right to freedom of speech and association. The
plaintiffs in Holder wished to train PKK members to use international
law to resolve disputes peacefully; they wished to teach PKK
members to petition the United Nations and other representative
bodies for relief; and they wished to engage in political advocacy on
7
behalf of Kurds living in Turkey and Tamils living in Sri Lanka.
The Supreme Court was unanimous that the first basis of the
plaintiffs’ case must fail. The relevant legislative terms were held
8
easily to satisfy the test laid down in United States v. Williams that a
statute is not unconstitutionally vague if “a person of ordinary
9
intelligence” is given “fair notice of what is prohibited . . . .” The
plaintiffs’ First Amendment arguments, however, divided the Court.
10
The majority emphasized that 18 U.S.C.A. § 2339B does not prohibit
the independent advocacy of a cause that is shared by a foreign
terrorist organization; what it prohibits is support (as defined) for
11
such a group. On this interpretation, the plaintiffs were permitted
12
under the statute to say anything they liked. Support was
criminalized under section 2339B because Congress had found that
“foreign organizations that engage in terrorist activity are so tainted
by their criminal conduct that any contribution to such an
13
organization facilitates that conduct.” In the Court’s opinion, this
view was justified by the record:
Material support meant to “promot[e] peaceable, lawful conduct” .
. . can further terrorism by foreign groups in multiple ways.

5. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2339A(b)(1) (West 2010).
6. Holder, 130 S. Ct. at 2714.
7. Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 9 F. Supp. 2d 1176, 1180–84 (C.D. Cal. 1998).
8. United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285 (2008).
9. Id. at 304.
10. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2339B (West 2010).
11. Holder, 130 S. Ct. at 2728 (emphasis added).
12. Id.
13. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 301(a)(7), 110
Stat. 1214, 1247 (1996).
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“Material support” is a valuable resource by definition. Such
support frees up other resources within the organization that may
be put to violent ends. It also importantly helps lend legitimacy to
foreign terrorist groups – legitimacy that makes it easier for those
groups to persist, to recruit members, and to raise funds – all of
14
which facilitate more terrorist attacks.

Justice Breyer dissented on this point, stating that he could not
agree that the “Constitution permits the Government to prosecute
the plaintiffs criminally for engaging in coordinated teaching and
advocacy furthering the designated organizations’ lawful political
15
objectives.” The dissent argued that 18 U.S.C.A. § 2339B was
required to be interpreted such that it included a mens rea
requirement, as follows:
[T]he defendant would have to know or intend (1) that he is
providing support or resources, (2) that he is providing that
support to a foreign terrorist organization, and (3) that he is
providing support that is material, meaning (4) that his support
bears a significant likelihood of furthering the organization’s
16
terrorist ends.

The dissent would have remanded the cases before the Court so
that lower courts could have applied this reading of section 2339B to
17
the plaintiffs’ proposed activities. The dissent’s interpretative stance
is addressed further at the end of this essay.
I. COUNTER-TERRORISM LAW IN THE UNITED KINGDOM
Configuring the justice and the fairness of counter-terrorism
legislation has been among the highest profile problems of
constitutional law in the United Kingdom since the turn of the new
century. This is not because either terrorism or counter-terrorism is
new to the United Kingdom: unlike the United States, the UK

14. Holder, 130 S. Ct. at 2725.
15. Id. at 2731.
16. Id. at 2740–41.
17. Id. at 2742. Note, Holder resolved two consolidated cases—Holder v. Humanitarian
Law Project (No. 08-1498) and Humanitarian Law Project v. Holder (No. 09-89), both of which
addressed the scope of section 2339B.
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possessed considerable experience of having to deal with terrorism
(principally in connection with Northern Ireland) long before 9/11.
Rather, it is the sheer quantity of counter-terrorism measures that are
now in force in the UK and, in particular, the novelty of a number of
these measures, which have proven problematic. The difficulties have
been compounded by the fact that when courts in the UK are
grappling with constitutional and legal issues, they must take into
account both the UK’s own domestic law and the law of the
European Union, as well as the relevant case law of the European
Court of Human Rights. Both the EU courts (now known as the
18
European Court of Justice and the General Court) and the Council
of Europe’s European Court of Human Rights enjoy a growing
19
influence in the area of counter-terrorism.
The modern story of the UK’s peacetime counter-terrorist
legislation dates from 1974 when, in response to a series of IRA pub
bombings, the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act
20
1974 (1974 Act) was passed. The 1974 Act listed the IRA as a
“proscribed organization” and made it a criminal offense to belong to,
to profess to belong to, or to solicit or invite financial or other support
21
for, a proscribed organization.
The 1974 Act was quickly supplemented with further counterterrorism legislation, notably the Northern Ireland (Emergency
22
Provisions) (Consolidation) Act 1978. Despite the words “temporary
provisions” appearing in the title of the 1974 Act, the legislation was
frequently renewed. By the late 1990s it had become the
government’s view that, despite the apparent successes of the
Northern Irish peace process, permanent counter-terrorist legislation

18. These are the names used by the Treaty of Lisbon, which came into force in December
2009. Before Lisbon the EU’s courts were known as the European Court of Justice and the
Court of First Instance.
19. The European Court of Justice (ECJ) and the European Court of Human Rights
(ECtHR) are frequently confused for each other, but they are separate entities which enforce
different legal regimes (EU law on the one hand, the European Convention on Human Rights
on the other). The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) is a creation not of the
European Union but of the separate organization, the Council of Europe. The role of the ECJ
within UK law is determined by the European Communities Act 1972; the role of the ECtHR
within UK law is determined by the Human Rights Act 1998. For a full account, see COLIN
TURPIN & ADAM TOMKINS, BRITISH GOVERNMENT AND THE CONSTITUTION ch. 5 (7th ed.
2011).
20. See David Bonner, Responding to Crisis: Legislating against Terrorism, 122 L.Q. R. 602
(2006).
21. Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1974, ch. 56, § 1 (U.K.).
22. Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1978 (Repealed 27.8.1991), ch. 5 (U.K.).
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would be required, not specifically for Northern Ireland but for the
whole of the United Kingdom. The result was the Terrorism Act
23
2000. Still in force, this substantial piece of legislation was designed
to be a comprehensive code of the UK’s counter-terrorism law. It
provides the legal definition of terrorism used in UK law; it makes
extensive provisions concerning proscribed organizations; it extends
the criminal law to deal with a number of specific terrorist offenses;
and it confers extended powers on the police, as well as legislating for
24
a range of other matters.
The Terrorism Act 2000 did not, however, long remain a
comprehensive code of the UK’s counter-terrorism law. Within a few
weeks of 9/11, Parliament had passed the Anti-terrorism, Crime and
25
Security Act 2001 and, in the years since, the Prevention of Terrorism
26
27
Act 2005, the Terrorism Act 2006, and the Counter-terrorism Act
28
2008 have been added. The quantity of this law is staggering, but so
too are some of the powers it confers. Let us take just one example:
the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 created a new scheme of
“control orders.” Control orders are coercive orders that may be
placed on an individual where the Secretary of State (a) has
“reasonable grounds for suspecting that the individual is or has been
involved in terrorism-related activity” and (b) “considers that it is
necessary . . . to make a control order imposing obligations on that
29
individual.” Control orders may be draconian in their effects,
imposing lengthy curfews, grave restrictions on freedom of movement
and extraordinary interferences with an individual’s private, social,
and family life. No criminal offense need be committed before a
control order may be made, and the courts have held that control
orders, despite their gravity and severity, are not criminal sanctions;
30
they are said to be preventative rather than punitive.

23. Terrorism Act 2000, ch. 11, §§ 1–131, schs. 1–15 (U.K.).
24. For a detailed commentary, see HELEN FENWICK, CIVIL RIGHTS: NEW LABOUR,
FREEDOM AND THE HUMAN RIGHTS ACT ch. 3 (2000).
25. Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, ch. 24 (U.K.).
26. Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005, ch. 2 (U.K.)
27. Terrorism Act 2006, ch. 11 (U.K.).
28. Counter-Terrorism Act 2008, ch. 28 (U.K.).
29. Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005, ch. 2, § 2(1).
30. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t v. MB, [2007] UKHL 46, [2008] 1 A.C. 440.
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II. TERRORISM AND THE CRIMINAL LAW
One may ask, why is any of this law necessary? Terrorism is a
crime (in fact, and as we shall shortly see, it is many crimes). Given
this, why does the state not simply rely on the criminal law to counterterrorism? If there is sufficient evidence of involvement in terrorism
to justify a control order, or to justify deportation, surely there is
sufficient evidence to prosecute? Those convicted of terrorist offenses
are going to suffer not merely from the inconveniences of being
placed under a control order, or of being deported. They are going to
serve long terms of imprisonment. Would this not be a more secure
way of protecting the public?
The United Kingdom, like the United States, has tried to find ways
of allowing the criminal law to play a greater role in countering
terrorism. The British government routinely claims that criminal
prosecution is its preferred means, but it seems it is not always
possible to prosecute. For one thing, the criminal standard of proof is
higher than the rather low threshold of “reasonable suspicion,” which
is sufficient for a control order. For another, the rules as to disclosure
in the law of criminal justice may be more burdensome on the state
(and more generous to the defendant) than is the case in civil matters.
And, the government is extremely reluctant to disclose material that
risks revealing the extent of the Security Service’s and Secret
Intelligence Service’s knowledge, the sources the Services rely upon,
their working methods, and the like.
It may be objected that there is a fundamental flaw in seeking to
rely on the criminal law as a major component of counter-terrorism
strategy. This is that criminal offenses are generally prosecuted after
they have been committed, and the government’s principal role in
countering terrorism ought to be to prevent it, rather than to wait for
an atrocity to kill and maim before seeking prosecutions. Such an
objection would be misconceived, however, given the extraordinary
array of offenses which now exist in relation to terrorism. The two
most important statutes here are the Terrorism Act 2000 (2000 Act)
31
and the Terrorism Act 2006 (2006 Act). The former continues the
scheme of proscribed organizations (which dates back to the
Prevention of Terrorism Act 1974). When the 2000 Act was passed,
fourteen organizations were listed as being proscribed, all of them

31. Terrorism Act 2006, ch. 11, §§ 1–38, schs. 1–3 (U.K.).
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connected with Northern Ireland. Since then, forty-six further
organizations have been added, all of them alleged to be connected to
international terrorism. Both the PKK and the LTTE (the two
organizations with which Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project was
32
concerned) are included on the list of proscribed organizations.
Sections 11–12 of the Terrorism Act 2000 make it an offense to
“belong[] or profess[] to belong to” or “to invite[] support for” a
33
proscribed organization. It is an offense under section 15 of the 2000
Act for anyone to invite a person to provide money or other property,
intending or having reasonable cause to suspect “that it may be used[]
34
for the purposes of terrorism.” Training in the making or use of
firearms, explosives or certain other weapons is prohibited by section
35
54 of the 2000 Act. The offense of inviting support for a proscribed
organization (section 12) is similar to the provisions at issue
concerning material support considered by the Supreme Court in
Holder.
Additional criminal offenses were created by sections 57 and 58 of
the Terrorism Act 2000. Under section 57 of the Act it is an offense to
“possess[] an article in circumstances which give rise to a reasonable
suspicion that [the] possession is for a purpose connected with . . .
36
terrorism.” It is a defense for a person charged with an offense under
this section to prove that his possession was not for a purpose
37
connected with terrorism. The offense in section 57 is a serious
crime: a conviction may result in a sentence of fifteen years
38
imprisonment. The offense consists of two elements, both of which
must be proved by the state to the criminal standard (“beyond
reasonable doubt”) in order to secure a conviction. That is to say, the
state must first prove beyond reasonable doubt that the defendant
32. Terrorism Act 2000, ch. 11, sch. 2 (U.K.). On the criteria for proscription and deproscription, see infra note 23. Note that in the UK both domestic and foreign organizations
may be proscribed. In this regard, the statement in Holder that “[w]e also do not suggest that
Congress could extend the same prohibition on material support at issue here to domestic
organizations” is striking. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2730 (2010).
33. Terrorism Act 2000, ch. 11, §§ 11(1), 12(1)(a). In this respect it appears there is a
difference between proscription in the UK and designation as a foreign terrorist organization in
the U.S.: 18 U.S.C.A. § 2339B does not criminalize mere membership in a foreign terrorist
organization. See Holder, 130 S. Ct. at 2718 (“Section 2339B does not criminalize mere
membership in a designated foreign terrorist organization.”).
34. Terrorism Act 2000, ch. 11, § 15(1)(b).
35. Id. at § 54.
36. Id. at § 57.
37. Id.
38. Id.
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was in possession of an article, and the state must then prove beyond
reasonable doubt that the circumstances of the defendant’s possession
of the article gave rise to a reasonable suspicion that he possessed it
39
for a purpose connected with terrorism. Even if the state can prove
both elements of the offense to the criminal standard of proof, this
may nonetheless not result in a conviction, for the defendant may be
able to prove that, notwithstanding any reasonable suspicion to the
contrary, his possession of the article was not in fact for terrorist
40
purposes. Section 58 of the Terrorism Act 2000 makes it an offense
to “collect[] or make[] a record of information of a kind likely to be
41
useful to a person committing or preparing an act of terrorism.”
Under this section it is also an offense to possess a document or
42
record containing such information. An offense under this section is
43
punishable by up to ten years imprisonment. It is a defense for a
person charged under section 58 to prove that he had a “reasonable
44
excuse for his action or possession.”
The reach of the criminal law was further extended under the
Terrorism Act 2006. Under section 1 of the 2006 Act it is an offense to
publish a statement by which a person either “intends members of the
public to be directly or indirectly encouraged . . . to commit, prepare
or instigate acts of terrorism” or is reckless as to whether the
45
statement will have such an effect. Section 1 further provides that
every statement which “glorifies the commission or preparation
(whether in the past, in the future, or generally) of such acts” is
46
expressed to fall within the scope of the offense. It is to be noted that
this offense can be committed without any person in fact being
encouraged or induced to engage in an act of terrorism. The
maximum sentence for a conviction under this section is seven years
47
imprisonment.

39. Id.
40. Id. The construction of the section 57 offense caused some problems, with courts
finding it difficult to establish which burdens of proof fell on which parties; the construction of
the offense summarized here is that which was laid down by the House of Lords in the leading
case of R v. G [2009] UKHL 13, [2010] 1 A.C. 43.
41. Terrorism Act 2000, ch. 11, § 58(1)(a).
42. Id. at § 58(1)(b).
43. Id. at § 58(4)(a).
44. Id. at § 58(3).
45. Terrorism Act 2006, ch. 11, § 1(1)(b)(ii) (U.K.).
46. Id. at § 1(2)(a).
47. Id. at § 1(7)(a).
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This is an offense that is designed to have an impact on free
speech. The offense is likely to survive any challenge brought in the
British courts on the basis of Article 10 ECHR, which protects
48
freedom of expression. Under the ECHR, freedom of expression is
not an absolute right, but is qualified. Interferences with freedom of
expression will be lawful if they are prescribed by law; if they are
proportionate; and if they serve some listed public interest, such as
safeguarding national security or public safety. These tests are likely
to be satisfied with regard to this offense. Even if the offense survives
judicial scrutiny, prosecutors bringing charges under section 1 must
ensure that their use of the provision is proportionate. Any
disproportionate use of the offense would be liable to be struck down
as incompatible with Article 10: such an outcome would render a
particular prosecution unlawful, but it would not affect the legislation
itself.
Further offenses were created by sections 5 and 6 of the Terrorism
Act 2006. Section 5 makes it a crime to engage “in any conduct in
preparation for” committing, or assisting another person to commit,
49
an act of terrorism. This offense is punishable by imprisonment for
50
life. Under section 6 it is an offense either to provide or to receive
“instruction or training . . . for or in connection with the commission
51
or preparation of acts of terrorism.” The maximum sentence for this
52
offense is ten years imprisonment.
III. CRIMINALIZING SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM
As noted in Part II, under section 12 of the Terrorism Act 2000 it
is a criminal offense in the United Kingdom to invite support for a
48. To my knowledge, no such challenge has been attempted.
49. Terrorism Act 2006, ch. 11, § 5(1).
50. Id. at § 5(3).
51. Id. at § 6(1).
52. Id. at § 6(5). A quarterly report is published by the government giving overall numbers
of terrorism charges and convictions (the published numbers do not give an offense-by-offense
breakdown). In 2008, twenty-nine charges were laid under the UK’s terrorism legislation, and
there were twelve convictions. In 2009, the figures were twelve and two respectively. Since 9/11
there have been 266 charges laid under the terrorism legislation, resulting in 122 convictions. See
HOME OFFICE STATISTICAL BULLETIN, OPERATION OF POLICE POWERS UNDER THE
TERRORISM ACT 2000 AND SUBSEQUENT LITIGATION: ARRESTS, OUTCOMES AND STOPS AND
SEARCHES, http:// rds.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs10/hosb1010.pdf (June 10, 2010). These figures
do not include those arrested for a terrorism offense but charged with and/or convicted of an
offense under other (non-terrorist) legislation. If these cases are added, the overall number of
terrorism-related arrests in the UK since 9/11 is 1,817, leading to 402 terrorism-related charges
and 235 terrorism-related convictions.
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proscribed organization. In more detail, section 12 is in the following
terms:
(1) A person commits an offence if—
(a) he invites support for a proscribed organization, and
(b) the support is not, or is not restricted to, the provision of
money or other property (within the meaning of section 15).
(2) A person commits an offence if he arranges, manages or assists
in arranging or managing a meeting which he knows is—
(a) to support a proscribed organization,
(b) to further the activities of a proscribed organization, or
(c) to be addressed by a person who belongs or professes to
belong to a proscribed organization.
(3) A person commits an offence if he addresses a meeting and the
purpose of his address is to encourage support for a proscribed
organization or to further its activities.

...
(6) A person guilty of an offence under this section shall be
liable—
(a) . . . to imprisonment for a term not exceeding ten years, to
53
a fine or to both . . .

There has been very little litigation with regard to this provision.
There has been no direct challenge to it in the way in which the
“material support” provisions of U.S. law were challenged in Holder v.
Humanitarian Law Project. This may be explained in part by the
different litigation strategies that seem to be favored in the U.S. and
the UK. In the United Kingdom, it is rare for a legislative provision to
be challenged in the abstract. It is far more common for a party to
challenge the way in which a provision is applied to it.
The most important case in connection with section 12 is Secretary
54
of State for the Home Department v. Lord Alton of Liverpool. This
case was brought by an all-party group of thirty-five parliamentarians
53. Terrorism Act 2000, ch. 11, § 12.
54. Lord Alton of Liverpool v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, Proscribed
Organisations Appeal Commission (POAC), Nov. 30, 2007, ¶¶ 340, 359, available at http://
www.siac.tribunals.gov.uk/poac/Documents/outcomes/PC022006PMOIFINALJUDGMENT.pd
f (last visited Sept. 21, 2010).
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who wished to arrange meetings at which support could be
encouraged for the People’s Mojahadeen Organization of Iran
55
(PMOI).
PMOI was a proscribed organization, but the
parliamentarians believed that the organization was no longer
involved in terrorist activity and had become a peaceful political party
56
advocating regime change in Iran. Unless PMOI was de-proscribed,
the parliamentarians would risk prosecution under section 12 were
57
they to hold such meetings of support. PMOI applied to the
Secretary of State to be de-proscribed, but the Secretary of State
58
refused its application. Lord Alton and his fellow parliamentarians
sought judicial review of the Secretary of State’s refusal to de59
proscribe PMOI.
Such cases are heard by the Proscribed Organizations Appeal
Commission (POAC), a statutory tribunal established under the
60
Terrorism Act 2000. POAC ruled that the Secretary of State’s refusal
to de-proscribe the People’s Mojahadeen Organisation of Iran was
61
unlawful. POAC’s decision was subsequently upheld on the
62
Secretary of State’s unsuccessful appeal to the Court of Appeal.
An organization may be proscribed only if the Secretary of State
63
“believes that it is concerned in terrorism.” It was common ground
in the PMOI case that the decision of the Secretary of State involved
a two-part analysis: first, he had to determine, in the light of all the
relevant evidence, whether he believed the organization was
64
“concerned in terrorism.” Second, if he did so believe, he then had to
consider whether or not his discretion to proscribe should be
65
exercised. It was also common ground that at the first stage the
Secretary of State had to have reasonable grounds for believing that

55. Id. at ¶¶ 19–20.
56. Id. at ¶¶ 22–23.
57. Id. at ¶ 20.
58. Id. at ¶ 31.
59. Id. at ¶¶ 32–37.
60. Terrorism Act 2000, ch. 11, § 5 (U.K.).
61. Lord Alton, POAC, ¶¶ 340, 359.
62. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t v. Lord Alton of Liverpool, [2008] EWCA Civ 443,
[2008] 1 W.L.R. 2341.
63. Terrorism Act 2000, ch. 11, § 3(4). The Terrorism Act 2006 added organizations which
are engaged in “the unlawful glorification of . . . terrorism” to those which are “concerned in
terrorism” for the purposes of the Secretary of State’s powers as to proscription. Terrorism Act
2006, ch. 11, § 21 (U.K.).
64. Lord Alton, POAC, ¶ 67.
65. Id. at ¶ 68.
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66

an organization is concerned in terrorism. POAC’s function
therefore was “to assess whether the grounds relied on were
67
reasonable in the light of all of the material before it.” The parties
were not agreed as to how POAC should undertake this task. The
appellants argued that, as various parties’ human rights were directly
in issue, POAC should adopt an intense standard of review; in
particular, they argued, POAC should assure itself that the Secretary
of State’s decision was based on “an acceptable assessment of the
68
facts.” The Secretary of State argued that human rights
considerations entered only at the second stage, meaning that the first
stage should be reviewed using only a low standard, such that POAC
should intervene only if the Secretary of State had done something
69
outrageous. POAC ruled that its function was “to subject both stages
70
of the decision making process to intense scrutiny.” POAC stated:
It is not our function to substitute our view for the decision of the
Secretary of State. . . . It is our function, however, to scrutini[z]e all
of the material before us carefully and to examine its strengths and
weaknesses to see if it provides reasonable grounds for the
Secretary of State’s belief [that the organization in question is
“concerned in terrorism”]. . . .

....
We accept that appropriate deference has to be given to the
Secretary of State in, for example, assessments of national security
or on foreign policy issues . . . . We do not accept, however, that we
can or should simply defer to the Secretary of State (or indeed the
views of the intelligence services or his advisers) on all matters. It
depends on the nature of the evidence or material being
considered. Much of the material before this Commission relevant
to the First Stage of the decision-making process is essentially
factual and is of a type that Courts are familiar with assessing in
71
ordinary litigation.

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Id. at ¶ 67.
Id. at ¶ 78.
Id. at ¶ 79 (emphasis omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at ¶ 82.
Id. at ¶ 113.
Id. at ¶¶ 116, 119.
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Applying this standard of review, POAC devoted seventy pages of
its judgment to a detailed analysis of the evidence as to whether
72
PMOI was or was not at the material time concerned in terrorism. It
concluded, contrary to the view of the Secretary of State, that it was
73
not. POAC criticized the approach adopted by the Secretary of
State: rather than focusing on the question of whether PMOI was
concerned in terrorism at the material time (that is to say, at the time
when the Secretary of State made his decision to refuse to deproscribe the organization), he had focused instead on the rather
different question of whether PMOI had done enough clearly and
unequivocally to show that its former terrorist operations had come
74
to a permanent end. The Secretary of State concluded that it had not,
not least because insufficient time had elapsed to form a reasonable
belief as to whether PMOI’s apparent cessation of terrorist activities
75
would become permanent. POAC found, by contrast, that there was
no evidence that PMOI possessed at the material time a “structure
that was capable of carrying out or supporting terrorist acts”; that
there was “no evidence of any attempt to ‘prepare’ for terrorism”; and
that there was “no evidence of any encouragement to others to
76
commit acts of terrorism.” From this it concluded that “the only
belief that a reasonable decision maker could have honestly
entertained” was that at the material time the PMOI was not
concerned in terrorism and could therefore not lawfully be
77
proscribed.
The Secretary of State appealed POAC’s decision to the Court of
78
Appeal. His principal argument sought to attack POAC’s criticism of
79
the way he had approached the question of de-proscription. His
argument was as follows: that whether “PMOI was ‘concerned in
terrorism’ depended critically on the intention of [PMOI’s leaders] as
to its future conduct”; that “[d]etermining [such] future intention . . .

72. Id. at ¶¶ 134–325.
73. Id. at ¶ 325.
74. Id. at ¶¶ 302, 334.
75. See id. at ¶ 333 (“[C]an the period of [five] years in which no terrorist attacks have been
claimed be regarded as providing strong/convincing evidence that PMOI has abandoned such
methods?” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
76. Id. at ¶ 348.
77. Id. at ¶ 349.
78. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t v. Lord Alton, [2008] EWCA Civ 443, [2008] 1
W.L.R. 2341.
79. See id. at 2351 (“The critical ground of appeal is . . . [that POAC] should have shown
deference to the Secretary of State’s decision.”).
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was a matter of assessment or evaluation”; that in reviewing this
matter POAC should have applied a lower standard of review and
“should have shown deference to the Secretary of State’s decision”;
and that, had POAC adopted such a standard, it should have found in
80
favor of the Secretary of State. The Court of Appeal had little
difficulty in rejecting this argument. It agreed with POAC that “an
organisation that has no capacity to carry on terrorist activities and is
taking no steps to acquire such capacity . . . cannot be said to be
‘concerned in terrorism’” even if its leaders may have intended “to
81
resort to terrorism in the future.”
A different perspective on the criminalization of support for
terrorism may be gained from recent case law of the EU’s courts. The
most important judgment of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in
82
this field thus far is its famous decision in Kadi v. Council. Kadi’s
assets were frozen under United Nations Security Council Resolution
83
1267. Among other matters, UNSCR 1267 requires all states to
“freeze the funds and other financial assets of individuals and entities
. . . as designated” by a Sanctions Committee, established under
UNSCR 1267 with the task of designating funds derived or generated
from, and property owned or controlled by, the Taliban, Osama bin
84
Laden or Al Qaida. Under Regulation 881/2002 the Council of
Ministers (an institution of the European Union) decided that
designations under UNSCR 1267 would be implemented within the
European Union at EU level, rather than severally by the EU’s
twenty-seven Member States. Article 2(1) of Regulation 881/2002
provides that “[a]ll funds and economic resources belonging to, or
owned or held by, a natural or legal person . . . designated by the
Sanctions Committee and listed in [the Annex to the Regulation]
85
shall be frozen.” Kadi was designated by the Sanctions Committee,
he was added to the list in the Annex, and his assets in the EU were
86
accordingly frozen under Article 2 of Regulation 881/2002.
Kadi brought legal proceedings in what is now the General Court
(formerly the Court of First Instance), seeking annulment of the EC
80. Id.
81. Id. at 2355.
82. Joined Cases C-402 & C-415/05 P, Kadi, Al Barakaat Int’l Found. v. Council, [2008]
E.C.R. I-6351.
83. Id. at ¶¶ 2–3.
84. Id. at ¶¶ 3–4.
85. Id. at ¶ 397.
86. Id. at ¶¶ 2–7.
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Regulation as it applied to him. Among other matters, he claimed
that his fundamental rights had been violatedspecifically, his right
to be heard, his right to property, and his right to effective judicial
88
protection. The General Court ruled that it could not review the
legality of Regulation 881/2002 against the standards imposed by
fundamental rights in EU law, as the measure simply applied in the
EU decisions that were taken at UN level by the Security Council’s
89
Sanctions Committee. While the Sanctions Committee might be
90
bound by aspects of international law, it was not subject to EU law.
Kadi appealed to the Court of Justice, which allowed his appeal,
ruling that Kadi’s right to be heard, his right to effective judicial
91
protection, and his right to property had been violated.
The ECJ’s statements in Kadi about the importance of
fundamental rights within the EU legal order are striking, but it
should be borne in mind that, even after the judgment, Kadi’s assets
92
remained frozen. The Court gave the Council three months in which
to comply with the requirements of the judgment—that is, three
months in which to offer Kadi some form of hearing compatible with
93
EU law. Kadi duly received narrative summaries of the reasons
provided by the UN Sanctions Committee as to why his assets should
94
be frozen and he was able to comment on them. His comments were
considered by the EU’s authorities, who concluded that “the listing of
Mr Kadi is justified for reasons of his association with the Al Qaida
95
network.” The European Commission therefore decided that Kadi’s
96
assets should remain frozen.
Kadi brought fresh proceedings in the General Court, challenging
the lawfulness of this decision. On September 30, 2010 that court
ruled in Kadi’s favor, holding that “the mere fact of sending the
applicant the summary of reasons cannot reasonably be regarded as

87. Id. at ¶ 8.
88. Id. at ¶ 17.
89. Id. at ¶ 18.
90. Id.
91. Id. at ¶ 55.
92. See Commission Regulation 1190/2008, 2008 O.J. (L 322) 25 (EC) (“[T]he Court
ordered the effects of Regulation (EC) No 881/2002 to be maintained, so far as concerns Mr
Kadi . . . for a period that may not exceed three months running from the date of delivery of the
judgment.”).
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
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satisfying the requirements of a fair hearing and effective judicial
97
protection.” The Court stated that “[i]t is essential that the applicant
be shown the inculpatory evidence used against him . . . in such a way
that he will have a fair opportunity to respond and to clear his
98
name.” As Kadi had been shown nothing like this amount of
information, his right to a fair hearing had not been respected, and the
Commission’s decision that Kadi’s assets should remain frozen was
unlawful.
99
In a decision of the European Court of Justice that was handed
down two months before the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Holder
v. Humanitarian Law Project, the ECJ appears to have made an
important statement about the limits of counter-terrorism law in the
100
European Union. The case is R (M) v. Her Majesty’s Treasury. Like
Kadi, it is concerned with the freezing of terrorist assets under
101
UNSCR 1267 and Regulation 881/2002.
M’s husband was
designated under UNSCR 1267, and, as a result, his assets in the EU
102
were frozen under Regulation 881/2002. Certain welfare and social
103
security payments were made to M. The question for the Court of
104
Justice was whether these payments should be frozen. The relevant
UK authority (HM Treasury) was of the view that the payments
should be frozen, on the basis that they were caught by Article 2(2) of
Regulation 881/2002, which provides that “[n]o funds shall be made
105
available, directly or indirectly, to, or for the benefit of” a person
106
designated by the Sanctions Committee. The Court of Justice
disagreed with the view of HM Treasury. The Court emphasized that
the funds in question were used by M to meet the essential needs of
the household and ruled that, in these circumstances, the benefit in
kind that a designated person might indirectly derive from such
welfare payments did not compromise the objective pursued by

97. Case T-85/09, Kadi v. Comm’n, 2010 EUR-Lex LEXIS 825 (Sept. 30, 2010).
98. Id., para. 158.
99. Case C-340/08, R (M) v. Her Majesty’s Treasury, http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/j_6/
(search case number C-340/08; then follow link to judgment of Apr. 29, 2010).
100. Case C-340/08, R (M) v. HM Treasury, http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/j_6/ (search
case number C-340/08; then follow link to judgment of Apr. 29, 2010).
101. Id. at ¶¶ 1–2.
102. Id. at ¶¶ 23–25.
103. Id. at ¶ 23.
104. Id. at ¶ 32.
105. Council Regulation 881/2002, 2002 O.J. (L 139) 9, art. 2, ¶ 2 (EC).
106. Case C-340/08, ¶¶ 33–37.
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Regulation 881/2002. That objective was “to stop designated persons
gaining access to economic or financial resources that . . . they could
108
use to support terrorist activities.” Thus, funds which such persons
could not so use were not caught by the terms of Regulation
109
881/2002.
Echoes of a similar, purposive, reading may be found in Justice
Breyer’s dissenting opinion in Holder. Justice Breyer stated that he
would read the material support provisions as “criminalizing FirstAmendment-protected pure speech and association only where the
defendant knows or intends that those activities will assist the
110
organization’s unlawful terrorist actions.” As we have seen, no such
purposive limitations are found in the United Kingdom’s various
criminal offenses with regard to proscribed organizations and the like.
It may be that, under the influence of EU law, such is the direction in
which the UK’s counter-terrorism law may travel in the future. As
things stand, however, the United Kingdom’s jurisprudence on the
criminalization of support for terrorism is much closer to that held
constitutionally permissible by the majority of the Supreme Court in
Holder.

107. Id. at ¶¶ 60–63.
108. Id. at ¶ 62.
109. Id. at ¶ 63.
110. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2740 (2010) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).

